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STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE PRODUCT
LIABILITY LAW: JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of joint and several liability originated from the concept
that "the act of one is the act of all."' This principle has come to mean
that all participants in a joint enterprise may be joined as defendants in
one action. Liability is joint in that all defendants may be joined together.
It is several in that each defendant is liable for the entire amount of the
damages. It is joint and several in that no defendant's liability is relieved
2
until the plaintiff's judgment is fully satisfied.
Until recently, joint and several liability had been adopted by nearly
all states. In response to the recent insurance crisis, however, several
states have elected to abolish or modify their joint and several liability
laws.3 This section will examine those changes and the policy decisions
behind them. The section also will explore the policy choices that have
led many states to return to the doctrine. Finally, it will suggest a list of
factors that legislators should consider before deciding to alter their state's
approach to joint and several liability.
WHY JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY HAS BEEN ABROGATED
OR CHANGED
During the 1960s, the widespread adoption of comparative negligence
forced legislators and judges to consider whether joint and several liability
could logically or practically coexist in the same jurisdiction as comparative
negligence. Several states found that it could not, reasoning that a defendant should not be forced to bear the entire risk of a judgment when a
joint tortfeasor is insolvent, unknown or is simply not a named party in
the action.4 In addition, these states were convinced that a wrong is
divisible, 5 and that a defendant's liability should be apportioned to the
degree of fault. 6 These states thus abrogated their joint and several liability
laws.
I.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613).
J. LIrr.E, CoMPAATrvE NEGLIGENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.30 (2) (1985).
See infra notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
See Paul v. N.L. Industries, 624 P.2d 68 (Okla. 1980) (it is not fair to those tortfeasors whom
the plaintiff decides to name in the action); Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1983)
(Uhlenhopp, J.,dissenting) (it is questionable why any defendant should be responsible for more
than his share of the blame); Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M.
App. 1982) (questioning the basis on which risk shifts if the defendant is insolvent).
See, e.g., Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. App. 1982) (the
concept of an indivisible wrong is obsolete).
See, e.g., Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978) ("The legislature intended to equate
recovery and duty to pay to degree of fault. ... There is not compelling social policy which
requires the co-defendant to pay more than his fair share of the loss.").
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Conflicts With Comparative Negligence
Some states adopted comparative negligence and elected to retain
joint and several liability. 7 This created a new set of problems as the two
doctrines enmeshed. As a result, some of these states began to modify or
abrogate the doctrine of joint and several liability.
One problem was a shift in liability for a judgment. Unlike contributory negligence states, in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, a defendant barely at fault can be forced to assume the entire burden of a
judgment against him and other defendants if joint and several liability
exists and other defendants remain judgment-proof.' Conceivably, a
defendant who is only one percent negligent may be forced to pay 100%0
of a judgment-which may include punitive damages. 9 This has led to
another problem: often plaintiffs name defendants not because their
liability is great, but because plaintiffs perceive them as having a lot of
money. Common deep-pocket defendants include insurance companies
and businesses.' 0
Another problem in these states is that plaintiffs are neither required
to, nor have the incentive to join all defendants." Non-joinder increases
the likelihood that one defendant or a few defendants will be forced to
bear all costs associated with a trial or settlement. The impact of non7.

8.

9.

10.
11.

Several states interpreted the adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as
prima facie evidence of legislative intent to retain joint and several liability. See Alaska Arctic
Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, 454
N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983); Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d (Fla. 1975). But see Bartlett v. New
Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. App. 1982).
Other states retained comparative negligence based on fairness to the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 578 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978); Weeks v. Feltner,
297 N.W.2d 678 (Ct. App. Mich. 1980).
Cf. Matthews v. Mills, 178 N.W.2d 841 (Minn. 1970) (injury is divisible); Tucker v. Union
Oil Co., 603 P.2d 156 (Idaho 1979) (legislature intended to retain joint and several liability);
Gazway v. Nicholson, 9 S.E.2d 154 (Ga. 1940) (although unfairness to defendants may arise in
some cases, joint and several liability must be retained); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
433A (1965) (takes position that joint and several liability should be retained); UNIoFR
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2 (1987) (joint and several liability is retained); AM. BAR Ass'N,
REPORT OF THE ABA ACTION COMM'N TO IM'ROVE TiE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM 24 (1987)
[hereinafter cited as REPORT] (plaintiff always should be entitled to full recovery).
See, e.g., O'Connor v. City of New York, 460 N.Y.2d 485, 447 N.E.2d 33 (Ct. App. N.Y.
1983) (city found only four percent negligent by jury for the explosion of a gas main was forced
to pay millions of dollars in damages because its co-defendants were unable to pay their portion
of the judgment); Sills v. City of Los Angeles, C-33504 (1985) (San Fernando Sup. Ct.) (although
city was found to be only 2207o negligent, the city paid nearly all of a $2.16 million award,
since the other defendant proved to be judgment-proof).
Several states have apportioned punitive damages. See, e.g., Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App.
3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979); Fredeen v. Stride, 269 Or. 369, 525 P.2d 166 (1974). But cf.
SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE, FINAL REPORT 17 (1986) [hereinafter
cited as Task Force on Insurance] (dissenting comment notes that no evidence was ever presented
that a court case in Wisconsin had ever imposed punitive damages upon a defendant based on
joint and several liability).
See Task Force on Insurance, supra note 9, at 17.
A plaintiff may obtain the entire amount of a judgment from one defendant; the defendant
may then seek contribution from other joint tortfeasors.
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joinder is mitigated in states with contributory negligence because even
the plaintiff's slight negligence will eliminate the cause of action and
relieve the defendant of all liability.
Finally, these states found that retention of joint and several liability
with comparative negligence encouraged large settlement awards. In cases
where litigation may have been more appropriate, defendants have settled
in order to avoid the deleterious effect of a judgment-proof co-defendant.
Under these circumstances, a defendant may settle for a higher amount
than is justifiable, fearing an even greater judgment against him or her
would result at trial.
Pressure from the Insurance Lobby
Insurance companies assert that the legal problems associated with
joint and several liability are key factors in rising insurance premiums.
Because the insurance industry cannot predict when an insured defendant
will be forced to pay entire judgments or when the insured will be forced
to settle, insurance companies have been forced to increase premiums
significantly to cover their risk. 12 Insurance companies further contend
that their involvement in litigation has increased because of the retention
of joint and several liability. The companies assert that they are often the
targets of lawsuits 3 simply because they guarantee a plaintiff complete
relief. This leads to14 increased expenditures for legal fees and, thus,
increased premiums.
The amount spent for legal fees is further aggravated because once
the insurance company has been joined in the lawsuit, it is forced to
litigate the issue more vigorously than those defendants who do not
possess adequate resources. They claim that they must provide the resources to defend all the joint tortfeasors in a suit in order to reduce the
chance of a high damage award.15
Finally, insurance companies assert that because joint and several
liability has been retained in comparative negligence jurisdictions, they
12.

The percentage of cases in which insurance companies are required to assume the full amount
of a judgment where co-defendants remain judgment-proof is unclear. Neither the insurance
industry nor proponents of abolishing joint and several liability have provided this data. See,
e.g., REPORT, supra note 7; STAFF OF THE FLA. S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, A REVIEW OF HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS-CURRENT PERSPECTIVES OF TI-E DOCTRINE OF JOINT AND SEVERAL LiABLrrY AND A

REVtEW OF TORT REFORM 51, 61 (Mar. 1986) (on file with the Committee) [hereinafter cited as
TORT REFORM REVIEW].

13.
14.

15.

Because a plaintiff can successfully collect the entire amount of a judgment from one defendant
where co-defendants remain judgment-proof, fewer defendants are joined in the action, and
insurance companies are usually among those joined.
Whether the percentage of product liability cases has increased remains questionable. See
Bancroft, Which Pocket Will Be the Deepest?, 75 CAL. ST. B.J. 257 (League of California
Cities claims that costs have risen because even ludicrous claims must be defended); but see
TORT REFORM REvIEw, supra note 12, at 166 (the number of product liability cases that went
to trial in Florida from 1983 to 1985 decreased).
A judgment-proof co-defendant has nothing to lose, so he or she is often unwilling to spend
money on legal fees.
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are now unable to insure certain entities. In some cases, an award, if
paid solely by their insured due to judgment-proof co-defendants, will be
so high that the risk of insuring them is economically unsound.
WHY STATES HAVE RETAINED JOINT AND SEVERAL
LIABILITY
Comparative negligence states that retained joint and several liability
after the adoption of comparative negligence or have considered the
advisability of retaining joint and several liability in light of the recent
insurance crisis offer several rationales for retaining the doctrine. They
believe comparative negligence can logically coexist with joint and several
liability, because an injury is divisible for purposes of joint and several
liability.' 6 These states also contend that if joint and several liability were
abrogated, a plaintiff often would not be able to obtain full compensation
for his or her injuries.' 7 Finally, without joint and several liability, a nonnegligent plaintiff would bear some of the loss if one of the other
defendants proved insolvent.'
These states also have considered the problems that changes in joint
and several liability might create. Although modification of the doctrine
might be feasible, abrogation would increase the number of parties in
each case because plaintiffs would attempt to sue all possible defendants.19
In addition, defendants probably would fight amongst themselves, making
the plaintiff's case much easier. 20
Modifying joint and several liability also would affect the principle
of proximate cause. Defendants often argue that the plaintiff's negligence
was the sole proximate cause of the event causing the injury, so the
defendant is not liable. If joint and several liability were abrogated, this
21
argument would no longer be useful.
The likelihood of settlement might be affected also. Although it might
encourage the defendant to settle a case more readily, 22 several liability

16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.

See, e.g., Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, 454 N.E.2d 197 (Ill. 1983).
See, e.g., Rozevink v. Faris, 342 N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1983) (suggests that a plaintiff may not be
able to obtain full compensation when a defendant is unknown or insolvent and the remaining
defendants may not be sued for the remaining amount).
See, e.g., id. (the burden of the insolvent defendant would fall entirely on the plaintiff, and
the plaintiff's damages would be reduced beyond the percentage of the negligence attributable
to the plaintiff).
If the plaintiff neglects to join all possible defendants, the named defendants enjoy tactical
advantages. For example, the named defendants could attempt to show that either absent or
unknown parties are liable to a greater degree. See generally Benson, New Role for Non-parties
in Tort Actions-The Empty Chair, 75 CoLo. LAW. 1652 (1986) (discussing the impact of absent
and unknown parties); J. DIMENTO & J. HAMRSON, JOINT AND SEvERAL. LIABI.ITY: A STUDY OF
THE FISCAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF A CHANGE IN THE DOCTRINE 27 (1985).
See TASK FORCE ON INSURANCE, supra note 9, at 57.
See id.
Under a several liability system, a plaintiff might want to settle earlier in the litigation if he or
she risks being held liable for the full amount of damages.
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might increase the risk of settlement for plaintiffs,2 3 thereby crowding the
docket. Finally, because the plaintiff would not be able to receive full
compensation for his or her injuries24 from private insurance companies,
the burden to provide such compensation might rest ultimately with state2
funded programs . 1
ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
States have addressed these policy considerations in various ways.
Colorado acknowledged the unfairness of requiring a minimally negligent
defendant to pay all of a judgment and statutorily eliminated joint and
several liability. 26 California voters specifically addressed insurance company complaints and abolished the doctrine by approving the Proposition
27
51 initiative.

Other state legislatures have addressed the joint and several liability
issue by allowing the doctrine only where the defendant's culpability is
of a specified percentage. 21 Illinois hopes to reduce the recurrence of cases
in which a defendant is held entirely liable for a judgment when he or
she is only minimally negligent and a co-defendant remains judgmentproof.29
23.
24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.

See J. DMENTO & J. HARRSON, supra note 19, at 27 ("a plaintiff may not be able to determine
with certainty what they [sic] are giving up vis-a-vis the potential liability of the settling
defendant").
"Assume, for example, a case in which a plaintiff incurs $1 million in injury, and each defendant
is found 25% liable. Assume also that Defendant 1 (DI) and Defendant 2 (D2) possess $25,000
of insurance coverage. D3 and D4 each own $1 million of insurance coverage. Under joint and
several liability, Dl and D2 could settle for $25,000 each, and D3 and D4 would remain liable
for the remaining $950,000. Under a several liability theory, however, D2 and D3 would be
liable for only $250,000 each. Plaintiff is thus compensated only for $550,000 of his total
damages." Id. at 14.
For example, Medicare or Medicaid.
See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1986) (changes the common law rule on the role of nonparties under the Colorado Comparative Negligence Act); Benson, supra note 19, at 1652.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431 (West 1987) (in personal injury, property damage or wrongful death
actions, liability for each defendant is several for non-economic damages).
See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1107.1, 2-1116 (1987) (in negligence and strict liability
cases, the plaintiff cannot recover if he or she is more than 50% at fault. If the plaintiff is less
than 50% at fault, damages will be reduced in proportion to the fault of the plaintiff); Tort
Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695 (the plaintiff may recover
economic damages only from defendants whose fault is equal to or greater than that of the
plaintiff; exempt from this rule until 1990 are cases with total damages of less than $25,000,
pollution cases, intentional torts and RICO actions, anti-trust, land sales and securities fraud
chapters; N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 1600-1603 (Consol. 1987) (limits the joint liability of a
tortfeasor with 50% or less relative culpability for non-economic loss to the defendant's equitable
share of the judgment in accord with culpability; exceptions include product liablity actions
where jurisdicition over the manufacturer could not be obtained with due diligence by the
plaintiff); MntN. STAT. ANN. § 604.02 (1) (West 1987) (if the state or municipality is jointly
liable, and its fault is less than 35%, the state or municipality is jointly and severally liable for
an amount no greater than twice the amount of its fault).
See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 1600-1603 (Consol. 1987) (a defendant's liability for noneconomic losses in an action covered by this statute involving two or more tortfeasors is limited
to the defendant's equitable share of the total fault); Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986,
ch. 86-0160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695 (joint and several liability law applies where the defendant's
fault is equal to or greater than that of the plaintiff, subject to several exceptions. Proportional
liability, not joint and several liability, applies to non-economic damages).
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Still other states allow joint and several liability only for economic
damages. 0 These reforms limit the liability of each joint tortfeasor to the
percentage of his or her culpability. Legislators, and the California voters
who passed Proposition 51,31 believe that limiting joint and several liability
to economic damages will reduce insurance premiums by encouraging
plaintiffs to carefully consider potential defendants. They maintain that
plaintiffs will be less likely to automatically include the defendants who
have the deepest pockets but are only minimally at fault. Plaintiffs will
be more likely to bring an action against those defendants who have acted
the most negligently and, thus, are liable for a greater amount of the
damages.12 In states where joint and several liability is additionally limited
to those situations where the defendant's culpability is less than or equal
to the plaintiff's, insurance companies will also incur less risk.
Legislatures in such states as Illinois have invoked measures to hold
defendants jointly and severally liable only if they have engaged in certain
activities.33 These measures allow the insurance industry to pinpoint areas
where liability probably will be found and reduce the insurance company's
risk that an insured will be forced to pay the full amount of a judgment.
Legislators predict that these reforms will reduce the cost of insurance
premiums. Finally, an Ohio law will protect defendants from being forced
to assume a co-defendant's liability when the co-defendant is unable to
pay his or her share of a judgment.3 4 This measure will help reduce
insurance company costs by encouraging additional means for collecting
a judgment.
CONCLUSION
Although it is impossible to predict which, if any, of these recent
reforms will ease the insurance crisis, states should consider several factors
before enacting such measures. First, proponents of the abolition of joint
and several liability have yet to present conclusive data indicating that an
insurance crisis exists. Assuming that the liability insurance crisis is real,
neither side has indicated conclusively whether joint and several liability
30. See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
32. Presumably, plaintiffs will not want to waste time and money in an action against defendants
who are only minimally at fault. In some cases, a plaintiff may even forgo bringing a cause of
action against a defendant who is clearly only minimally at fault.
33. Illinois law provides that in product liability suits based on strict liability, defendants shall be
jointly and severally liable for medical and related damages. A defendant 25% or less liable for
the total negligence of all parties shall be severally liable for all other damages. But a defendant
more than 25% liable for the total negligence of all parties shall be jointly and severally liable
for all other damages. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1117, 2-1118 (Smith-Hurd 1986)
(provisions do not apply to environmental and medical malpractice cases).
34. 1986 Ohio Laws 2315.19 (D)(1) (provides that if a defendant is judgment-proof, the court will
reallocate among the other defendants and the plaintiff his or her portion of the judgment
according to a specified formula and subject to a specified vicarious liability restriction. This
will limit the amount of damages that a defendant will be required to pay).
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has contributed significantly to higher insurance premiums. No evidence
has been offered by either side that the insurance crisis is greater or the
same in those states that abrogated joint and several liability many years
ago.
Assuming that the insurance crisis is less significant in those states
that abolished joint and several liability during the 1970s, states must still
consider the effect of modifications or abrogation of the doctrine. Some
preliminary findings indicate that a change or abolition of joint and
several liability will produce effects far worse than the current insurance
problem." Each state must also examine the unique set of circumstances
existing in that state and should research the particular effect of changing
the joint and several liability doctrine in that jurisdiction.16 Until each
state considers these issues, a change in the age-old joint and several
liability doctrine would be premature.
Mary A. Laudick*

35.
36.
*

See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
A state that already has instituted a program of caps on damages, for example, might not find
it beneficial to also abrogate joint and several liability, because caps may improve the liability
crisis without further action.
B.A., Denison University, 1985; J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 1988.

